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Abstract 
 
While much work in macroeconomics considers the formation of price expectations, there has 
been relatively little work analyzing wage expectations. This study develops models in which 
workers form expectations of average wages in choosing levels of effort and on-the-job search, 
under the assumption that information on lagged average wages is available at a low fixed cost, 
while acquiring other information requires an additional variable cost. Under reasonable 
conditions, workers’ expectations are at least partly adaptive. It is argued that wage 
expectations may be more important than price expectations in explaining unemployment 
fluctuations.  
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The Formation of Wage Expectations in the Effort and Quit Decisions of Workers 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In recent years economists have done a good deal of research on the issue of price 
expectations. One line of inquiry involves testing whether survey measures of expected inflation 
satisfy the criteria for rational expectations. In a second line of research, Mankiw and Reis 
(2002) assume that some firms operate with out-of-date information about optimal prices, and 
they demonstrate that this “sticky information” model can explain output and inflation dynamics 
better than a model with sticky prices. However, while price expectations have received much 
attention, a related issue that has been overlooked is workers’ expectations about average wages.  
This study models the formation of workers’ wage expectations and argues that 
expectations of average wages may be at least as important as expectations of the price level in 
explaining unemployment fluctuations. Workers’ wage expectations are analyzed in the context 
of their effort and on-the-job search decisions, since these decisions depend on the relationship 
between a worker’s current wage and his or her expectations of the mean of the aggregate wage 
distribution. Under reasonable conditions, it is demonstrated that workers’ wage expectations are 
partly adaptive and that they make systematic errors in their expectations. 
The motivation for this work is that systematic errors in wage expectations may have 
significant macroeconomic consequences. If workers’ expectations about average wages are not 
completely rational, they may appear to exhibit money illusion in their effort and quit decisions. 
In Section 2 it is argued that the wage expectations of workers may be more important than the 
price expectations of either firms or workers in explaining business cycle fluctuations.  
Section 3 develops a model of information acquisition for the effort decision of workers. 
It is assumed that workers can form expectations of average wages both by using an adaptive 
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expectations calculation based on lagged information that is available at a low fixed cost and by 
paying an additional variable cost to acquire further information that yields a more accurate 
estimate. A worker seeks to minimize the sum of information acquisition costs and the utility 
loss that results from making decisions with imperfect information (since the effort exerted by a 
worker who forms incorrect wage expectations will be non-optimal). Two methods for acquiring 
additional information about average wages are considered: gathering and analyzing 
macroeconomic data and sampling wages at a subset of firms. It is demonstrated that workers’ 
expectations are likely to be at least partly adaptive, and may be a mixture of rational and 
adaptive expectations. It is also demonstrated that demand shocks have persistent effects if 
expectations are adaptive, but not if expectations are based on macroeconomic data or sampling 
wages. The model is modified in Section 4 to analyze the job search decision, which affects 
workers’ quit behavior. Section 5 concludes and discusses implications of the model. 
The main contributions of this study lie in identifying the benefits of information to 
workers and developing microfoundations to explain why utility-maximizing workers may form 
expectations that are partly adaptive.
1
 In doing so, it provides theoretical justification for 
efficiency wage modeling in which effort and quits depend partly on lagged average wages. In 
addition, this study shows how microeconomic parameters affect the degree to which 
expectations are based on lagged average wages vs. additional costly information, and how these 
parameters determine the weights placed on various lags of wages. 
 
2. Why Wage Expectations Matter 
There is an extensive literature that involves testing the rationality of price expectations, 
and much of this work uses the survey of economists conducted by Joseph Livingston and/or the 
household survey conducted by the Michigan Institute of Social Research. Taken together, these 
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studies suggest that expectations are neither completely rational nor completely adaptive. On one 
hand, Evans and Gulamani (1984), Batchelor and Dua (1989), Roberts (1997), Thomas (1999), 
and Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers (2003) find that expectations do not satisfy the criteria for 
rational expectations, as they show that forecast errors can be predicted by information available 
at the time of the forecast (e.g., money supply growth, unemployment, the budget deficit, interest 
rates, the output gap, and lagged inflation). On the other hand, the findings of Mullineaux (1980), 
Gramlich (1983), and Baghestani and Noori (1988) indicate that expectations are not purely 
adaptive.
2
 In addition, Fuhrer (1997) and Roberts (1998) demonstrate that expectations can be 
described as a mixture of rational and adaptive expectations.
3
 In a similar vein, Pfajfar and 
Santoro (2010) examine a cross section of individuals’ inflation forecasts, and they find that 
some individuals have rational expectations, some form their expectations adaptively, while the 
expectations of others are based on adaptive learning and sticky information.  
The assumption that expectations are not purely rational is made in Mankiw and Reis’s 
(2002) sticky information model. Mankiw and Reis assume that some firms (chosen randomly) 
operate with current information about optimal prices, while the remaining firms operate with 
out-of-date information, and they demonstrate that their model outperforms the sticky price 
model in explaining output and inflation dynamics. 
In the studies that test the rationality of inflationary expectations and in the sticky 
information model, the variable of interest is price expectations. In contrast, the present study 
assumes that individuals have imperfect information about average wages. While this study 
differs from the rest of the literature by considering wage expectations rather than price 
expectations, the macroeconomic consequences of imperfect information may be more important 
for wage expectations than for price expectations. 
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Labor market outcomes are determined from the interactions between firms and workers. 
From the perspective of firms, it is not clear why their knowledge of the price level would be 
inaccurate enough to cause large fluctuations in unemployment, since information on the price 
level is available on the internet from the Bureau of Labor Statistics on a monthly basis. Even if 
firms lack perfect information about the price level, there is no obvious mechanism through 
which imperfect information would translate into large changes in unemployment. For example, 
Mankiw and Reis consider firms’ pricing and output decisions but do not consider their wage 
and employment decisions, and there is no reason why firms in their model would not 
continually set wages at their market-clearing level.  
The behavior of workers is likely to be influenced more by their expectations about 
average wages than by their expectations about the price level. Workers make several decisions 
that may affect the wages set by firms: at what value to set their reservation wage, whether to 
quit, how much effort to exert, and how much labor to supply. Theoretical considerations suggest 
that these decisions are likely to depend more on relative than on real wages. Reservation wages 
(controlling for labor supply) and quits should depend on relative wages, since workers make 
these decisions by comparing wages at a given firm with wages elsewhere. Two models, the 
shirking model and the gift-exchange model, emphasize the effect of wages on workers’ effort. 
In the shirking model the relative wage is the relevant variable, since wages elsewhere affect the 
cost of job loss. In the gift-exchange model, effort could depend on either relative or real wages, 
depending on whether workers are more concerned with how their pay compares with the market 
wage or with the prices of goods and services. The one decision that unambiguously depends on 
real wages is labor supply. However, most studies find a small elasticity of labor supply with 
respect to the real wage.
4
 In addition to these theoretical arguments, the dramatic rise in real 
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wages over the past 60 years, without a correspondingly significant decline in the quit rate or 
significant increase in effort, also suggests that quits and effort depend more on relative wages 
than on their real wages. Thus, it is reasonable to believe that workers’ behavior is influenced 
more by their expectations of average wages than by their expectations of the price level.  
In addition, workers probably make larger errors in wage expectations than in price 
expectations. As previously discussed, the Consumer Price Index is published monthly and is 
available on the internet. On the other hand, the relevant wage for workers’ effort and quit 
decisions is the average wage for workers in the same occupation with similar qualifications 
(e.g., experience and education), and this information is not easily obtainable. In fact, employers 
in Bewley’s (1999) survey believed that their workers did not have a very precise idea about the 
wages at other firms. 
If firms pay efficiency wages, workers’ imperfect information about average wages may 
have significant macroeconomic consequences, since firms take into account the reaction of 
workers in setting wages. In particular, an efficiency wage model with imperfect information 
about average wages can explain nominal wage rigidity.
5
 For example, if workers’ expectations 
are partly adaptive, firms have an incentive to adjust nominal wages slowly in response to 
contractionary shocks, out of concern that adjusting wages too quickly would adversely affect 
effort and quits, and this sluggish adjustment would likely cause unemployment to rise.  
 
3. Expectation Formation in Choosing Optimal Effort 
3.1 General model 
One explanation for a positive relationship between wages and effort is the shirking 
model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), in which a higher wage raises the cost of job loss and 
induces workers to exert more effort. The cost of job loss depends negatively on the wages 
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offered by other firms, which means that workers’ effort depends on the relationship between 
their current wages and average wages in the rest of the economy.  
In the shirking model, it is generally assumed that all firms pay the same wage, which 
means that workers know with certainty the average wage offered by other firms. In reality, 
however, this is not a reasonable assumption. Wages vary across employers, even for jobs that 
are similar, and workers generally do not have perfect information concerning the wages offered 
by other firms. Lacking perfect information, workers need to form expectations about wages 
elsewhere in order to provide the optimal amount of effort. The relevant comparison for workers 
is likely to be average wages in their occupation.  
A worker who forms incorrect expectations of the average wage will exert a non-optimal 
level of effort and suffer a utility loss. A worker overestimating average wages will exert less 
than optimal effort, so that on average, the loss of future earnings resulting from the increased 
probability of dismissal will exceed the utility gain from lower effort. A worker who 
underestimates average wages will suffer the opposite type of utility loss.  
This section models information acquisition by workers, who incur costs from acquiring 
information and from making decisions with imperfect information. It is assumed that wages 
vary across firms and that the average wage is unobserved. While the mean of the wage 
distribution is unknown, workers have two main ways to estimate it. First, they can observe past 
average wages at a low fixed cost and can predict this mean from an adaptive expectations 
procedure. This fixed cost is assumed to be low enough that everyone acquires this information. 
For example, as part of its Occupational Employment Statistics program, the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics publishes figures on average wages for more than 800 occupational groups, based on 
the May CPS. However, these statistics are not published until March of the following year, a lag 
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of ten months. The fixed cost can be viewed as the time spent looking up lagged average wages 
in one’s occupation on the BLS website. 
Second, workers can incur an added variable cost to obtain additional information about 
average wages. They face the tradeoff that acquiring more information is costly, but it enables 
them to more accurately estimate the mean of the wage distribution, resulting in effort that is 
closer to its optimal level. There has been little previous work on how workers estimate average 
wages, so it is not clear how they form their estimates. In addition to observing past wages, 
possible ways to estimate average wages include gathering and analyzing macroeconomic data 
(e.g., the growth rate of money, fiscal policy, and unemployment) and obtaining information on 
wages at a subsample of firms (e.g., by contacting firms, talking to friends, reading help-wanted 
ads, and searching on websites that have information on employment opportunities).
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It is assumed that the amount of information acquired by workers is determined by the 
following framework. Suppose a worker chooses effort (e) to maximize 
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where  is the discount rate, c is consumption, )( teu is the utility or disutility of effort,
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 r is the 
interest rate, LI is labor income, Pr[Empt] is the probability that a worker is employed in period t, 
and B represents the income of an unemployed individual. The probability of dismissal is 
assumed to depend negatively on a worker’s effort, so that the probability of employment in 
period t depends on a worker’s effort in previous periods. Expected labor income in future 
periods is assumed to equal the worker’s current wage if he or she is still at the same firm and to 
equal the expected average wage if he or she is employed elsewhere.  
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Campbell (2006) demonstrates that the expected utility of a worker who maximizes the 
above utility function can be expressed as ),,( ttt ewwV , where wt is the worker’s current wage 
and tw  is the average wage.
8
  This expression for V takes into account the disutility of effort and 
the utility of consumption, which depends on income in the current and future periods. Effort has 
two opposing effects on lifetime utility. An increase in effort reduces current utility, but it also 
reduces the probability of dismissal, which increases expected future income and thus raises 
expected lifetime consumption. Optimal effort is determined from the condition dV/det=0.  
Suppose that a worker does not know with certainty the true mean of the wage 
distribution ( tw ) and forms an estimate of this mean, denoted by 
e
tw . Let )( twe  represent effort 
when a worker knows that the mean of the wage distribution is tw  and )(
e
twe  represent effort 
when the worker estimates that the mean is 
e
tw . The utility loss (VL) resulting from incorrect 
expectations of average wages can be expressed as  
(2) ))(,,())(,,()(
e
ttttttt
e
t wewwVwewwVwwVL  ,      
           with 0 and  0)0(  LVVL . 
The assumption that 0LV  means that the utility loss rises at an increasing rate as the 
difference between 
e
tw  and tw  increases.
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 The total expected utility loss (TEUL) equals the cost of acquiring information plus the 
expected utility loss from imperfect information, so that  
(3) )]([)( t
e
t wwVLEICTEUL  , 
where C(I) is the cost of acquiring information. Approximating (3) with a second-order Taylor 
expansion around the point where 
e
tw = tw  yields  
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This expression can be simplified by making the substitutions VL(0)=0 and 0)0( LV  and by 
using the fact that )0(LV   is a constant.
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depends negatively on the quantity of the worker’s information. A worker 
acquires the amount of information that minimizes this expected utility loss.  
To obtain an expression for ])[( 2t
e
t wwE   it is necessary to make assumptions about 
demand and wage setting. It is assumed that demand follows an autoregressive process, 
(5) ttt mm   1 , 
where mt is the log of demand, which is assumed to be unobserved, and t is a white noise error 
with variance 2 . As for wage setting, Appendix A demonstrates that the efficiency wage model 
of Campbell (2010) implies that the log of the wage set by the ith firm is described by the 
relationship, 
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,        
where etw is the average worker’s expectation of the average wage, tw  is the actual average 
wage,  depends on microeconomic parameters, t  is a common white noise error, and it  is an 
idiosyncratic white noise error that sums to 0 across firms. The presence of this idiosyncratic 
error term means that wages vary between firms. By aggregating across firms, the average wage 
is given by, 
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where  tt  )1(  and 
2)(Var wt   . Taking expectations of both sides of (6b) yields 
(7) et
e
t mw  , 
where etm  is the average worker’s expectation of demand.  
As previously discussed, all workers are assumed to incur the fixed cost to obtain 
information on past average wages. The next subsection develops a model in which workers 
form expectations of current average wages by supplementing this information by gathering and 
analyzing macroeconomic data. Then subsection 3.3 assumes that workers sample wages at other 
firms to update the information contained in lagged average wages. Both subsections show how 
microeconomic parameters affect the amount of additional information acquired and the degree 
to which expectations are based on lagged average wages relative to additional information.  
 
3.2 Observing lagged average wages and gathering macroeconomic data 
This subsection models the wage expectations of workers who use information on lagged 
average wages and macroeconomic data. Workers are likely to differ in their wage expectations, 
and it will be assumed that individual wage expectations are normally distributed around the 
average wage expectation. Since the wage expectation of the average worker is what determines 
the firm’s optimal wage, this subsection considers the average wage expectation.11 To estimate 
current average wages from past average wages, the average worker is assumed to use 
information on average wages in period t-1 )( 1tw  and his or her own prior expectations of 
average wages in period t-1 ( etw 1 ), where 
e
tw 1  represents the expectations formed prior to t-1 of 
average wages in period t-1. Workers use this information to estimate demand in t-1 (mt-1), which 
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is a predictor of current demand, based on the relationship in (5). From (7), workers’ 
expectations of average wages equal their expectations of demand. The average worker obtains 
information about mt-1 from the relationship in (6b), which can be rewritten as 
(8) 1111 )1(   tt
e
tt mww  . 
In addition, individuals can incur a cost in period t to obtain information on demand in 
period t-1 by gathering and analyzing macroeconomic variables such as GDP, unemployment, 
fiscal policy, and the growth rate of the money supply.
12
 This information ( Itm 1 ) is assumed to 
provide an unbiased but noisy estimate of the true value of demand, so that  
(9) 111   tt
I
t mm  , 
 
where t  is a serially uncorrelated error term with variance 
2
I . Let I represent the amount of 
information acquired, over and above information on lagged average wages. It is assumed that 
2
I  depends negatively on I and that more information reduces this variance at a non-increasing 
rate, implying that 2I  can be expressed as )(
2 II  with 0/
2 dId I  and 0/
222 dId I . In 
addition to acquiring information about mt-1 in the current period, it is also possible that workers 
acquire revised information about macroeconomic variables in periods prior to t-1 that enables 
them to update their expectations of demand in previous periods (i.e., Itm 2 , 
I
tm 3 , …), since 
macroeconomic data are often revised and since current information about demand may shed 
light on demand conditions in previous periods.  
 A worker’s expectation of demand (and thus his or her expectations of average wages) 
can be viewed as being determined from a Kalman filtering process. The relevant equations are 
(5) and the system of equations in (8) and (9),   
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Appendix B demonstrates that the average worker’s wage expectation is 
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In these expressions for K1 and K2, 
2
 represents the variance of the difference between etm  and 
the true value of mt. Appendix B derives an expression for 
2
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The value of 2I (and thus of 
2
) depends on the amount of information acquired. To 
decide how much information to obtain, workers need to calculate the expected utility loss from 
imperfect information, which depends on 2][ t
e
t wwE  . The difference between tw  and 
e
tw  is 
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Let c represent the cost of each unit of information. Then the total expected utility loss can 
be expressed as  
(13)
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Appendix B demonstrates that  
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implying that workers acquire less information as the cost of acquiring information increases and 
acquire more information as demand becomes more variable.
14
 It should be noted that c may 
depend partly on the transparency of policymakers, since increased transparency reduces the cost 
of macroeconomic information. 
If  20 I , (11) demonstrates that workers’ wage expectations are a mixture of the 
expectations formed with lagged average wages and the expectations formed with 
macroeconomic data.
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 The relative weight that workers place on lagged average wages, as 
compared to macroeconomic variables, depends on the sums of coefficients on these variables, 
which, in turn, depend on the model’s microeconomic parameters. The sums of coefficients are 
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Thus, the ratio between the sums of coefficients equals the ratio of K1 to K2, which is 
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Thus, workers place relatively more weight on lagged average wages as the cost of 
information increases, so that expectations become relatively more adaptive. As demand 
variability rises, they place relatively more weight on macroeconomic information, implying that 
their expectations become less adaptive. In addition, (11) shows that the model’s microeconomic 
parameters also determine the coefficients on each value of lagged wages. 
The difference between expectations formed with lagged wages and expectations formed 
with macroeconomic data is important because wages respond qualitatively differently to 
demand shocks in these two cases. In particular, demand shocks have persistent effects if 
expectations are formed with lagged wages, but not if they are formed by observing 
macroeconomic variables.  
Suppose the economy has been in a steady-state equilibrium prior to period 1, with
0 tt wm  for t≤0. Then suppose there is a one-time demand shock of * in period 1, so that 
1=* and t=0 for t≥2. As a result, mt=
t-1* for t≥1. We first consider the case in which 
expectations are based solely on lagged average wages. (This will occur if 2I , meaning that 
macroeconomic data contribute no relevant information.) In this case, Appendix C demonstrates 
that wages in period t are  
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Thus, tt mw   at each value of t, although this difference decreases over time. From 
(A8), the deviation of the unemployment rate (ut) from the natural rate (u*) is ttt mwuu 

. 
As a result, demand shocks cause persistent changes in unemployment, with ut gradually 
approaching u* over time.  
 In contrast, suppose wage expectations are based solely on macroeconomic data. 
(This will occur if 0
2 I .) In this case, K1=0 and K2=, so that 
I
t
e
t mw 1  .
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 Therefore, 
01 
ew  and   1tetw for t≥2. From (6b), average wages are 
 1w and 
  1ttw  for t≥2. 
As a result, 
 )1(11 mw  and 0 tt mw for t≥2, meaning that demand shocks affect 
unemployment in period 1, but have no effect thereafter.  
The model developed in this subsection assumes that t is unpredictable at the beginning 
of period t. The model could be extended to make t partly dependent on policymakers’ actions 
and to enable individuals to form expectations about these policies. If workers have complete 
information about policy shocks, these shocks will raise mt, 
e
tw , and tw  by the same amount, so 
unemployment would be unchanged in the current period, as well as in future periods. 
A relevant issue is whether the expectations formed with macroeconomic information 
satisfy the criteria for rational expectations. Suppose rational expectations are defined as 
expectations that are unbiased and whose errors are serially uncorrelated and unpredictable to 
agents with superior information. Since jtjt
I
jt mm     for all j, the term 
I
jt
j mKKK 
 
1
212 )(  is an unbiased predictor of the actual value of demand and is thus an 
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unbiased predictor of the wage that would prevail under perfect information.
 
In addition, if 
agents with superior information do not know the subset of information used by individual 
workers, expectational errors will be unpredictable to these agents. However, this term may 
exhibit serial correlation, since it includes all past values of m
I
. If workers do not update their old 
information about aggregate demand, past errors in demand expectations would be correlated 
with current errors. On the other hand, if workers acquire updated information that enables them 
to form new estimates of lagged values of demand and if the new errors are orthogonal to the 
old,
19
 then wage expectation errors will be serially uncorrelated, so that overall expectations will 
be a mixture of rational and adaptive expectations. 
3.3 Observing lagged average wages and sampling wages at other firms 
A second way for workers to acquire additional information about the mean of the wage 
distribution is by randomly sampling wages at other firms. In this subsection, it is assumed that 
workers use information about lagged average wages (employing the Kalman filtering process 
described in the previous subsection) to form their prior beliefs about the mean of the wage 
distribution, but do not acquire information about macroeconomic variables. They then randomly 
sample other firms’ wages, which are assumed to be normally distributed (in terms of logs) with 
a variance of 2WD , to update their prior beliefs. In this case, expectations are a mixture of 
rational and adaptive expectations, and closed-form solutions can be obtained for the amount of 
information acquired and for the degree to which expectations are rational vs. adaptive.   
The assumption that workers do not acquire information about macroeconomic variables 
implies that 2I . Given this assumption, workers’ prior beliefs about the mean of the wage 
distribution, based on lagged wages, are given by (11) with K2=0 and  
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 . 
As before, the variance of the difference between this estimate and the actual average wage is 
222
w  , and in this case 
2  is calculated at 2I .   
Let I
 
represent the number of wages sampled, c represent the cost of each observation, 
and Ietw
, represent the average of the wages sampled. The value of 
Ie
tw
,
 should be an unbiased 
predictor of tw  , and the difference between these variables should be serially uncorrelated and 
unpredictable to other agents. Given the mean and variance of the prior distribution, the mean of 
the posterior distribution is 
(15)  
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and the variance of the posterior distribution is 
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Since the expectations formed by sampling wages have the characteristics of rational 
expectations, (15) implies that expectations are a weighted average of rational and adaptive 
expectations, with  measuring the degree to which expectations are rational. In this case, the 
total expected utility loss is  
(18)
 I
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Appendix B derives closed-form solutions for I and , and demonstrates that   
 0 and  ,0,0,0
22

 

 d
d
dc
d
d
dI
dc
dI
.        
Thus which measures the degree to which expectations are rational, depends 
negatively on the cost of sampling wages and depends positively on the variability of demand.  
The positive dependence of  on 2  may provide an explanation for Lucas’s (1973) 
finding that countries with greater variability in inflation experience smaller increases in output 
in response to nominal demand shocks. As demonstrated in this section, expectations become 
relatively more rational and relatively less adaptive as the variance of demand increases. As 
expectations become more rational and less adaptive, Campbell (2010) shows that the Phillips 
curve becomes steeper, and Campbell (2009) shows that the aggregate supply curve becomes 
steeper, which means that a given nominal demand shock has a smaller effect on real output.  
Subsection 3.2 shows that when expectations are formed solely with macroeconomic 
information, unpredictable demand shocks do not change wage expectations in the current period 
and thus affect current unemployment (although these shocks have no effect on future 
unemployment). In contrast, if expectations are formed solely by sampling wages, then demand 
shocks affect current wage expectations by the same amount, on average, and thus do not 
systematically cause changes in current unemployment.  
 
4. Expectations Formation in Choosing Optimal Job Search Intensity 
Section 3 develops a model in which workers acquire information about average wages in 
choosing their level of effort. Another decision workers make is how much time to spend looking 
for a different job, and this decision also depends on the ratio of their own wages to average 
19 
 
wages elsewhere. Workers need to estimate the mean of the wage distribution to determine how 
much time to devote to job search, and their process of information acquisition can be modeled 
in the same way as in Section 3. In fact, the job search decision is probably more important for 
macroeconomic outcomes than the effort decision described in Section 3 (based on the shirking 
model), since survey evidence suggests that theories involving turnover are much more relevant 
than theories involving shirking in explaining the rigidity of wages.
20
 
In deciding how much job search to undertake, workers face the tradeoff that job search 
is costly, but that it may enable them to find a job that will yield higher income in the future. The 
present value of a worker’s expected lifetime utility can be denoted ),,( ttt swwV , where wt and 
tw  are defined as in Section 3, and st measures the worker’s job search intensity. If )( tws  
represents the optimal amount of search when a worker knows that the mean of the wage 
distribution is tw  and )(
e
tws  represents the optimal amount of search when the worker estimates 
that the mean is 
e
tw , the utility loss resulting from imperfect expectations of average wages is  
))(,,())(,,()( ettttttt
e
t wswwVwswwVwwVL  . 
Using a model similar to the one developed in Section 3, it can be demonstrated that, in 
choosing how much time to devote to job search, workers’ expectations of average wages will 
likely be at least partly adaptive.  
Workers will quit their present jobs if they find a more attractive job at a different firm. 
The probability that a worker quits depends on two factors: 1) the difference between the 
worker’s current wage and the actual mean of the wage distribution, and 2) the worker’s search 
intensity. The worker’s search intensity matters because, controlling for the first factor, the 
20 
 
probability of finding one of the jobs that offers a higher wage depends on how hard he or she 
searches. Accordingly, the probability of a worker quitting can be expressed as 
))(,( etttt wwswwfq  . 
Since quits depend on job search intensity, and since job search depends on 
e
tw , workers’ 
quit propensities depend on their expectations of average wages, as well as on the actual average 
wage. The fact that quits are a function of average wage expectations means that quits will 
depend on lagged average wages if workers’ wage expectations are partly adaptive. 
Campbell (1995) finds support for the hypothesis that quits depend partly on lagged 
average wages. In this study, quit rates in 2-digit SIC manufacturing industries are regressed on 
current and lagged industry wages and on current and lagged values of average manufacturing 
wages. Industry wages have a negative effect on quits, while average manufacturing wages have 
a positive effect. The hypothesis that industry wages and average manufacturing wages have an 
equal (but opposite) long-run effect on industry quits cannot be rejected. However, industry quit 
rates respond almost immediately to industry wages, but respond with a relatively long lag to 
average manufacturing wages, suggesting that expectations of average wages are partly adaptive. 
 
5. Conclusion  
This study develops a model in which workers obtain information on lagged average 
wages at a low fixed cost and can then supplement this with additional information for an added 
variable cost. This additional information enables them to more accurately predict the mean of 
the aggregate wage distribution, helping them to make better choices about their effort and job 
search intensity. It is demonstrated that workers’ expectations of average wages are likely to be 
at least partly adaptive. Their expectations are a mixture of rational and adaptive expectations if 
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they obtain additional information by sampling wages or if they acquire macroeconomic data and 
orthogonally update previous information. The degree to which expectations are rational vs. 
adaptive depends on the cost of acquiring information and on the variability of demand.   
The main contributions of this work lie in highlighting the importance of workers’ wage 
expectations and in identifying the benefits of information about average wages. This 
information is valuable to workers because it enables them to more optimally choose their effort 
level and job search intensity. In addition, this study shows how microeconomic parameters 
affect the degree to which expectations are rational vs. adaptive and how these parameters affect 
the coefficients on the various lags of wages. The model developed here provides 
microfoundations for modeling in which expectations about average wages are partly adaptive. 
The distinction between adaptive expectations and expectations formed with unbiased 
information is qualitatively significant. To the extent that expectations are adaptive, demand 
shocks have persistent real effects. In contrast, demand shocks have real effects for one period, at 
most, if expectations are formed by analyzing macroeconomic data or sampling wages.  
This study also provides an alternative explanation for Lucas’s finding that nominal 
demand shocks have a smaller effect on real output in countries with greater inflation variability. 
It is demonstrated that workers’ expectations become relatively less adaptive as the variability of 
demand increases. As expectations become relatively less adaptive, the Phillips curve and the 
aggregate supply curve become steeper, so that nominal shocks have smaller real effects. 
One implication of this study is that more work should be done on the issue of how 
workers estimate wages elsewhere. While there has been a great deal of research on price 
expectations, there has been relatively little (if any) research on the formation of wage 
expectations. This study discusses several methods that workers may use in estimating average 
22 
 
wages, such as analyzing macroeconomic data and sampling wages at other firms. In addition, 
workers may employ other methods to estimate average wages. Investigating the ways that 
workers predict average wages would yield insights into the response of effort and quits to 
macroeconomic shocks. Since firms take the response of workers into account in setting wages, 
such research may provide a better understanding of the reasons for sluggish nominal wage 
adjustment.  
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Appendix A 
 
 
Equations (4) and (6) in Campbell (2010) are 
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where Q is output, A represents technology, L is employment, K0 is the capital stock (assumed to 
be fixed), e is the efficiency of the average worker, which depends on the ratio between a 
worker’s wage (W) and the worker’s expectation of the average wage ( eW ) and on the 
unemployment rate (u),  is the price elasticity of demand, Y is real aggregate demand per firm, 
and P  is the aggregate price level. Aggregate demand is assumed to be determined from the 
constant velocity specification, ttt PMY / . Solving the aggregate demand equation for P  and 
substituting it into (A2) yields 
(A3) 
.],/[
)1(
)1()1(
)1(
)1(
)1)(1(
0
)1(
)1(
)1(
1
)1(
)1(






































 

tt
e
tt
tttt
MuWWe
KAYWL
 
Since output equals aggregate demand in equilibrium, Q from (A1) can be substituted 
into Y in (A3). Making this substitution gives the following expression for Lt: 
(A4) 
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t
t
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The unemployment rate can be expressed as 
(A5) 
N
LN
u tt

 , 
where N is labor supply per firm. This expression implies that )1( tt uNL  . Substituting this 
value for employment into (A4) yields 
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By taking logs of both sides, aggregating over the entire economy, and using the approximation, 
tt uu  )1ln( , unemployment is 
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where tw  is the average wage and lower case letters represent natural logs (except for ut). If the 
equilibrium values of w and m are normalized to be equal to one another, the difference between 
the unemployment rate and the natural rate (u*) is 
 (A8) ttt mwuu 

. 
Equation (10) in Campbell (2010) can be expressed as 
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Substituting (A8) into (A9) yields 
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where itw  is the wage of an individual firm and tw  is the average wage. The above equation can 
be expressed as  
(A10) tt
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11
, 
where  
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
 . 
 In Campbell (2010), 0ue , 0Wue , and 0WWe , which implies that 0<<1.  
In addition, there may be errors in wage setting. From (A9), a firm’s optimal wage 
depends on the values of ue , Wue , WWe , and  
e
tw . Suppose that firms do not know these values 
with certainty and that there are both common and firm-specific errors in estimating these values. 
Then the actual wage set by firms will differ from its optimal value, as expressed in (A10), by 
both a common and firm-specific error term. Thus, the wage of the ith firm can be expressed as 
(A11) itttt
e
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where * is the common error and  is the firm-specific error.  
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Appendix B 
Derivation of (11), (12a), and (12b): 
 
Given the system of equations in (10), a worker’s estimate of mt can be expressed as
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In (B2), 2 represents the variance of the difference between etm  and the true value of mt.  
Substituting (7) into (B1) yields the following relationships: 
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By solving (B3b) recursively, the average worker’s wage expectation is 
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Calculation of 2 and its derivatives: 
  
The value of 2 can be calculated as follows:23 
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The first derivative of 2 with respect to 2I  is  
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The second derivative of 2 with respect to 2I  is   
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Given the total expected utility loss in (13), the optimal amount of information is determined from 
the first-order condition,  
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Totally differentiating (B5) with respect to I, c, and 2 yields the following comparative static 
results: 
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From (18), the optimal amount of information is determined from the first-order condition, 
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Substituting (B7) into (16) enables  to be expressed as, 
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By differentiating (B8), the following comparative statics results are obtained: 
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Appendix C 
 
If 2I , then (11) can be expressed as, 
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222
2
1])1[(
w
wxz




  . 
 
Thus, 
 
 
tw  




























 










222
2
1
222
2
2
222
2
222
2
1
1
1
1
1
w
w
t
w
w
t
w
w
t
w
w
t x  
 
 






















































 















222
2
1
222
2
2
222
22
222
2
1
222
2
222
2
1
1
1
)1(
1
1
w
w
t
w
w
t
w
w
w
w
t
w
w
w
w
t  
 
 
 






































 









22
1
222
2
22
22
1
222
2
2222
1
1
])1([
t
w
w
w
t
w
w
ww
t  
 
 
tw  




















 



1
222
2
1 )1(1
t
w
wt . 
 
34 
 
References 
 
Baghestani, Hamid, and Esmail Noori, “On the Rationality of the Michigan Monthly Survey of 
Inflationary Expectations,” Economics Letters, 1988, 27, 333-335. 
 
Batchelor, Roy A., and Pami Dua, “Household versus Economist Forecasts of Inflation: A 
Reassessment,” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, May 1989, 21, 252-257. 
 
Bewley, Truman F., Why Wages Don’t Fall During a Recession, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1999.  
 
Blundell, Richard, and Thomas MaCurdy, “Labor Supply: A Review of Alternative Approaches,” in 
Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 3A, edited by Orley C. Ashenfelter and David Card, 
Amsterdam: North Holland, 1999.  
 
Campbell, Carl M. “A Cross-Industry Time-Series Analysis of Quits,” Quarterly Review of 
Economics and Finance, Spring 1995, 35, 53-72. 
 
________, “A Model of the Determinants of Effort,” Economic Modelling, March 2006, 23, 215-
237.  
 
________, “An Efficiency Wage – Imperfect Information Model of the Aggregate Supply Curve,” 
University Library of Munich, MPRA Paper 15296, June 2009.  
 
________, “Deriving the Wage-Wage and Price-Price Phillips Curves from a Model with Efficiency 
Wages and Imperfect Information,” Economics Letters, May 2010, 107, 242-245.  
 
Campbell, Carl M., and Kunal S. Kamlani, “The Reasons for Wage Rigidity: Evidence from a 
Survey of Firms,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, August 1997, 112, 759-789. 
 
Card, David, “Intertemporal Labor Supply: An Assessment,” NBER Working Paper 3602, January 
1991.  
 
Carroll, Christopher D., “Macroeconomic Expectations of Households and Professional 
Forecasters,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, February 2003, 118, 269-298. 
 
Conlisk, John, “Optimization Cost,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, April 1988, 
9, 213-228. 
 
Evans, George, and Riyaz Gulamani, “Tests for Rationality of the Carlson-Parkin Inflation 
Expectations Data,” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, February 1984, 46, 1-19. 
 
Fuhrer, Jeffrey C., “The (Un)Importance of Forward-Looking Behavior in Price Specifications,” 
Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, August 1997, 29, 338-350. 
 
35 
 
Gramlich, Edward M., “Models of Inflation Expectations Formation,” Journal of Money, Credit, 
and Banking, May 1983, 15, 155-173. 
 
Ljungqvist, Lars, and Thomas J. Sargent, Recursive Macroeconomic Theory, Second Edition, 
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2004.  
 
Lucas, Robert E., Jr., “Some International Evidence on Output-Inflation Tradeoffs,” American 
Economic Review, June 1973, 63, 326-334.  
 
Mankiw, N. Gregory, and Ricardo Reis, “Sticky Information versus Sticky Prices: A Proposal to 
Replace the New Keynesian Phillips Curve,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, November 
2002, 117, 1295-1328. 
 
Mankiw, N. Gregory, Ricardo Reis, and Justin Wolfers, “Disagreement about Inflation 
Expectations,” NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2003, 18, 209-248.  
 
Mullineaux, Donald, J., “Inflation Expectations and Money Growth in the United States,” American 
Economic Review, March 1980, 70, 149-161.  
 
Pfajfar, Damjan, and Emiliano Santoro, “Heterogeneity, Learning and Information Stickiness in 
Inflation Expectations,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, September 2010, 
75, 426-444. 
 
Roberts, John M., “Is Inflation Sticky,” Journal of Monetary Economics, July 1997, 39, 173-196. 
 
________, “Inflation Expectations and the Transmission of Monetary Policy,” Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System, Finance and Economics Discussion Series, 1998-43, October 
1998. 
 
Sethi, Rajiv, and Reiner Franke, “Behavioural Heterogeneity under Evolutionary Pressure: 
Macroeconomic Implications of Costly Optimisation,” The Economic Journal, May 1995, 
105, 583-600.  
 
Shapiro, Carl, and Joseph E. Stiglitz, “Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device,” 
American Economic Review, June 1984, 74, 433-444. 
 
Thomas, Lloyd B., “Survey Measures of Expected U.S. Inflation,” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, Fall 1999, 13, 125-144.  
 
 
 
  
36 
 
Footnotes 
                                                          
1
 Conlisk (1988) discusses theoretical reasons for why rational behavior may result in expectations that are not 
unbiased. Under the assumption that it is costly to form accurate expectations of next period’s price, he demonstrates 
that optimal forecasts may be a weighted average of an unbiased estimate obtained from agents’ costly optimization 
activities and a “free estimator,” which may be determined from an adaptive expectations process. However, Conlisk 
does not identify the benefits of information.  
2
 Mullineaux (1980) and Gramlich (1983) find that, controlling for lagged inflation, other macroeconomic variables 
have significant effects on expectations, which suggests that economists and households use more than just past 
inflation to predict future inflation. Additional evidence that expectations are not purely adaptive comes from 
Baghestani and Noori (1988), who find that survey respondents predict inflation more accurately than an ARIMA 
model, implying that their expectations depend on more than just lagged inflation. 
3
 Fuhrer (1997) estimates Phillips curves in which expected inflation depends on a weighted average of lagged inflation 
and actual future inflation. He can reject the hypothesis that expectations are completely rational, but cannot reject the 
hypothesis that they are completely adaptive. However, he demonstrates that inflation dynamics are predicted more 
accurately by a model with mixed rational and adaptive expectations than by a model with completely adaptive 
expectations. Roberts (1998) shows that survey forecasts of inflation can be explained by a model in which part of the 
population has rational expectations and the rest has adaptive expectations. 
4
 Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) report on previous estimates of labor supply elasticities in Tables 1 and 2 of their study. 
The average uncompensated labor supply elasticity reported in these tables is 0.086 for men and 0.689 for married 
women. In addition, Card (1991, p. 22) reviews several previous studies of labor supply and concludes, “Taken 
together, the literature suggests that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is surely no higher than 0.5, and probably 
no higher than 0.20.”  
5
 In conventional efficiency wage models, efficiency depends on the actual real or relative wage of workers, so these 
models are unable to explain nominal wage rigidity. 
6
 An additional way to form expectations of average wages is to use information on expected price inflation, since wage 
inflation and price inflation are highly correlated. As discussed in Carroll (2003), evidence suggests that some 
households use the forecasts of professional forecasters to form their expectations of price inflation.  
7
 The overall utility of effort may be either negative or positive, but the marginal utility of effort will be strictly negative 
for a utility-maximizing worker. 
8
 Campbell (2006) makes specific assumptions about workers’ utility, the probability of dismissal, and the probability of 
an exogenous separation. A more general version of the model is available from the author upon request.  
9
 For example, if the utility loss is represented by the quadratic equation, 2)( t
e
t wwVL  , then 2LV . In the 
analysis in Section 3, )( t
e
t wwVL   is treated as a general functional form. However, an equation representing this loss 
can be obtained if specific assumptions are made about the utility function of workers, the probability of dismissal, and 
the probability of an exogenous separation. In an unpublished appendix, which is available at 
http://www.niu.edu/econ/directory/faculty/campbell/CampbellApp1.pdf, the effort model of Campbell (2006) is used to 
derive a specific expression for )( t
e
t wwVL  . 
10
 The fact that 0)0( LV is obtained from the relationship ))(/)(/()(/ t
e
tt
e
t wweeVLwwddVLLV  , 
where 0/  eVL  at the point t
e
t ww  . 
11
 The results are the same if we consider the wage expectation of an individual worker, except that the variance of the 
error would be higher by an additional error term representing the difference between the average wage expectation and 
the individual’s wage expectation. 
12
 It is assumed that data on macroeconomic variables for period t are not available until the end of the period. 
13
 This expression does not include the small fixed cost that workers incur to acquire information about lagged average 
wages.  
14
 Consistent with these results, Sethi and Franke (1995) develop a model in which agents can choose whether to use a 
costless adaptive expectations procedure or pay to acquire information that allows them to predict the true outcome with 
certainty. They find that agents are more likely to acquire this information when optimization costs are low or when the 
economy is characterized by a “high degree of exogenous variability.” 
15
 If 0
2 I for a non-infinite value of I and if workers acquire this amount of information, then K1=0. On the other 
hand, K2=0 if macroeconomic variables contribute no relevant information (i.e., 
2
I ). 
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16
 If =1, the sum of coefficients on jtw   plus the sum of coefficients on 
I
jtm  equals 1. If <1, the sum of the sums of 
coefficients is less than 1 since, on average, m will be lower in period t than in period t-1 if <1. 
17
 This derivation assumes that t=0 for all values of t.  
18
 When K1=0 and K2=, the coefficients on values of m
I
 prior to period t-1 equal 0.  
19
 In particular, suppose that in period t-1 a worker obtained information about macroeconomic variables in period t-2 
that enabled him or her to estimate demand in t-2 and let this estimate of demand be denoted 
I
tt
m
12  . Then suppose in 
period t the worker receives revised information about macroeconomic variables in t-2 that leads the individual to 
estimate that demand in t-2 was 
I
tt
m
2 . If 
I
ttt
mm
122 
  is uncorrelated with 
I
ttt
mm
22 
 , then the new errors would 
be orthogonal to the old. 
20
 In Campbell and Kamlani’s (1997) and Bewley’s (1999) surveys of employers, respondents indicated that they 
viewed labor turnover as being much more important than shirking in explaining wage rigidity.  
21
 Equation (A9) in the present study differs from (10) in Campbell (2010) in that Campbell (2010) expresses wages and 
wage expectations as percentage deviations from steady-state values (rather than as natural logs), does not include firm 
subscripts on the wage (although these subscripts are implied since (10) is derived from the profit-maximizing behavior 
of individual firms), and expresses the difference between the unemployment rate and the natural rate as dut, rather than 
as ut-u*. In Campbell (2010), ue , Wue , and WWe  represent, respectively, the derivative of efficiency with respect to the 
unemployment rate, the cross derivative of efficiency with respect to wages and unemployment, and the second 
derivative of efficiency with respect to wages. 
22
 In Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004, p. 123), see equation (5.6.2) for a statement of the equation for 
e
tm  and equation 
(5.6.3a) for a statement of the equation for K1 and K2.  
23
 See Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004, p. 123, equation 5.6.3b) for a statement of this equation. In this study, 2 is 
equivalent to  in Ljungfqvist and Sargent. The present study assumes that the economy is in a steady-state equilibrium, 
so that t+1=t. 
